THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE BY A DIRECTOR PURCHASING STOCK FROM HIS STOCKHOLDERS by WALKER, ROBERTS
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XXXII MAY, 1923 No. 7
THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE BY A DIRECTOR PUR-
CHASING STOCK FROM HIS STOCKHOLDERS
RoBERTs WALE
There is no impressive dissent from the proposition that a director or
officer' of a corporation is to be deemed a trustee for the corporate body,
the aggregate of assets, liabilities and business belonging to the stock-
holders. From this proposition some have argued that each director
should be deemed a fiduciary for each individual stockholder. This
claim has been most aggressively put forward in cases where a director
has direct dealings with a stockholder in matters relating to the corpora-
tion. The most frequent case is the purchase of its stock by a director.
It has been asserted that, since a director must occupy a better informed,
a superior position, he must not only answer all questions but must
volunteer all pertinent information in his possession, when bargaining
for the shares. As a fiduciary, the argument runs, he must make fullest
disclosure before having any business dealings with his cestui or ward.
And it is claimed that the reported decisions have laid the foundation for
this fiduciary doctrine.
But when this body of law is examined, the support for the fiduciary
doctrine seems slight indeed. The lack of a clean-cut state of facts,
sharply raising the fiduciary question, is the rule rather than the
exception and, as in hunting the snark, the bowsprit gets mixed
with the rudder sometimes. Law gets jumbled with equity.
Deceit, fraud, abuse of position, overreaching of the ignorant,
these and the like confuse the judges. Often the courts seem to have
failed to observe that trading is full of human nature, a stock trade no
less than a horse trade. Buyers and sellers alike may be crafty, and
more than one seller has been known to be a welsher. Cases that could
and should have been decided on grounds of fraud or deceit have been
'Elsewhere in this paper "director" is to be taken as including also "officer,"




needlessly dignified by the application of the fiduciary doctrine. On
occasions some appealing feature of the case seems to have led to
dragging in the fiduciary doctrine as the lesser of two evils.
Historically, the doctrine had every chance to bloom and prosper.
When business corporations were new, small and private affairs, direc-
tors may well have possessed secret and more accurate information, and
have thus been able to buy shares to the disadvantage of other stock-
holders. But we nevertheless find that the courts began by taking quite
the other view. A venerable American decision 2 announced, somewhat
obiter, that there is no legal privity between shareholders and directors;
"the directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such
individual stockholders." The stockholder had brought an action on
the case at conimon law, alleging that his shares had become worthless
by the directors' malfeasance. The latter's demurrer was sustained.
An early British decision3 had much to say about "a relation of confi-
dence as to property," but the facts were that the directors for years
had rendered untrue and depressing accounts of the company's business,
whereby the stockholder had at last been induced to sell to them at a
great undervalue-a clear case of fraud, in other words. In the first
pertinent New York case,4 dealings in shares were held not to be within
any trust relationship. Here the director gave honest answers to all
questions and all the representations made by him were true; but he
did not tell that war work then in process might result in large divi-
dnds, a prediction that nobody could have made with certainty at the
time, but which turned out to be so. Of all the reported decisions, this
one seems to strike the fairest balance of good law and common sense.
Forty years later, in a dissenting opinion, judge (afterward Mayor)
Gaynor put the subject with equal common sense but in a less inviting
aspect:'
"That the defendants were selfish is no reason for deciding against
them. Political economy from Adam Smith down, and before him, is
founded on selfishness, and not on generosity, or Christian charity."
The early Rhode Island case of Fisther v. Budlong6 was brought, quite
properly, as an action on the case for deceit, and the director seems to
have been so deceitful that to apply the fiduciary doctrine would have
been superfluous. The leading Indiana decision, 7 after reviewing the
above Massachusetts, British, and New York cases, found no actual
fraud in the facts before it and decided (one judge of five dissenting)
'Smith v. Hurd (1847, Mass.) 12 Metc. 371.
'Walshiam v. Stainton (1863, Ch.) i DeG., J. & S. 678.
"Carpenter v. Danforth (1868) 52 Barb. 581.
'FVon Au v. M/1agenlwhzer (19o8) 126 App. Div. 257, 271, io N. Y. Supp. 629.
639. The judgment of the court was affirmed in (19o9) 196 N. Y. 51o, 89 N. E.
1114.
"(1873) IO R. I. 525.
'Board of Comrs. of Tippecaiwe County v. Reynolds (873) 44 Ind. 509.
THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE BY A DIRECTOR 639
against the fiduciary theory. Here a county had sold its shares to a rail-
road president, who later made a profitable resale. That a county was
the stockholder well illustrates the circumstance that stockholders are
not necessarily of inferior business capacity or entitled to guardianship.
A contemporary Tennessee case," in sustaining a demurrer to the bill,
held that directors are free to buy stock on the same terms as other
persons.
It is obvious from this summary that the fiduciary doctrine has no
ancient origin. Fraud and deceit afforded remedies in proper cases in
the earlier law of our land. Chancery seems to have entertained no
cases from its viewpoint of fiduciary conduct. But when law and
equity began to fuse, some disorder began to appear. It was then that
the rather vague idea of a separate, active, fiduciary duty began to take
shape: the duty of a director, when buying shares, to reveal all that he
knows, hopes, expects, and suspects.
The decisions have been so extensively dissected by law writers that
few of them need to be here summarized again. Indeed, one could at
best only bring down to date the several admirable studies of this ques-
tion.9 Since the earlier decisions, judicial thought, particularly at a
distance from salt water, seems to have beclouded rather than clarified
the state of the law. Leaving the safe human ground of fraud or
deceit, some courts have gone about establishing an abstract obligation,
a commandment or ethical principle. They would ordain that no direc-
tor may buy stock in his company without first disclosing anything and
everything that he then knows or surmises to its advantage, present or
future. Anything "bullish," that is to say. For this precept is singu-
larly market-wise. It presupposes that a director would not be buying
except for a rise. It would not have him buy unless the stockholder
first be told of all the director's reasons for expecting a profit. It recks
not whether the director may be foolish or mistaken. It subjects the
director to all possible chances of losing his trade (and possible other
trades), not to mention the company's business, 0 by his candid garrulity.
Its logic is that the director may reap profits on stock that he already
holds, but that he may not buy additional shares without first letting the
shareholders in on his knowledge, foresight, reading of the signs of the
times, or other motives for buying. And woe betide him if he omit
'Deaderick v. Wilson (1874) 8 Baxt. io8.
'E. g., Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Share-
holder (igio) 8 MICHr. L. REv. 267; Laylin, The Dity of a Director Purcha.ing
Shares of Stock (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL 731; H. R. Smith, Purchase of
Shares of a Corporation by a Director front a Shareholder (1921) 19 MicE. L.
REv. 698. The diligent Mr. Cook [i Stock and Stockholders (3d ed. 1894) sec.
320, p. 431, note i] points out inter alia that recent editions of Story's Equity
Jurisprudence omit an earlier adverse criticism of Carpenter v. Danforth.
Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed. 1886) sec. 565, p. 537, note I.
' One British case, however, had the sagacity to point out that it might be to the
corporation's disadvantage for a director to tell of pending deals, whereof secrecy
might be the best discharge of his duty. Percival v. Wright [19o2] 2 Ch. 42I, 426.
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to do so. For he may, even to his own astonishment, make a profit on
shares bought from Smith, and Smith may then sue him, alleging that
the director knew or foresaw, when he bought, this or that feature that
explains the rise of the shares. The luckless director may or may not
have known it or foreseen it. His "superior knowledge" by virtue
of his position as director may, probably will, be held up against him,
and he may be deemed to have known or foreseen. At any rate, that
is the risk that he runs in states where the fullest disclosure is requisite
before a director may lawfully buy shares.
An odd feature of this doctrine is that it is one-sided, lacking' a
converse. For the selling stockholder seems not to be required to tell
anything he knows." The director's "superior knowledge" counts as
omniscience. The stockholder's knowledge or wisdom or obligation of
candor is as naught. Courts, in the Mississippi basin especially, seem
to cherish a mental picture of shrewd, sharp, scheming directors
craftily trading with inexperienced, female, infant, defective stock-
holders. In a word, the kind of stockholders for whom the law should
guarantee bank deposits, prohibit cigarettes, or control reading matter.
No account is taken, it would seem, of great aggregations of experience
and common sense, which nevertheless are stockholders, such as insur-
ance companies, the Foundations, banks and trust companies, and many
other institutions, nor of numerous powerful sagacious individual stock-
holders who pile up fortunes by judging stock values accurately.
This viewpoint-that a director must disclose ere he buy-would be
most unsettling if enforced in financial centers, or respecting great
corporations with hosts of stockholders. Particularly so where' there
are markets or stock exchanges. The New York courts recognized this
fifty-five years ago. "As to stocks which have a regularly quoted price
or market value, parties generally sell and buy them, with reference to
this price or value, rather than with reference to their real value, or any
opinion of their real value, founded on a knowledge or supposed knowl-
edge of the conditions of the corporations or of their affairs."'1 2 Prices
of such stocks must be deemed to find their price level in the market by
the action of a congeries of forces: facts, hopes, beliefs, buying or
selling movements, interest rates, and a hundred other factors. There
is complete anonymity of buyer and seller. The purchasing director
would not know to whom to disclose. His broker does not know the
seller behind the selling broker, and'vice versa. The seller does not
seek out the buyer's motive or identity, but sells because he wishes to
sell. For practical reasons, if for no others, the doctrine of duty to
"This seems unduly lop-sided as law though consistent enough logically, in
jurisdictions where a vendee has a right to rely on the vendor's representations,
even if all means of knowledge be open to the vendee. Caveat vendor! Fargo
Gas Co. v. Fargo (1894) 4 N. D. 219, 59 N. W. io66 and Prescott v. Brown (1911)
30 Okla. 428, 120 Pac. 991 are cited to this effect in Halsell v. First Nat. Bank
(1915) 48 Okla. 535, 150 Pac. 489.
' Carpenter v. Danforth, supra note 4; at p. 586.
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disclose must, it would seem, vanish where general trading markets
exist for the shares. The courts that hold for that doctrine cannot be
dealing with that sort of marketed shares. They have before them the
relatively small corporations of relatively few stockholders, whose
affairs are not bulletined in the daily press nor, as a rule, elaborately set
forth in periodical reports to stockholders. In such companies, direc-
tors and officers may often possess much "inside information" not avail-
able to other shareholders. Even in states where the fiduciary doctrine
is held, it would seem unjust to impress an active duty to disclose upon
directors or officers of corporations other than such as we have just
described. The criterion here suggested is not size merely, but size
plus (I) availability to stockholders of information on finances and
transactions and (2) the existence of a market in which shares are
generally traded.'8 Bearing in mind these two qualifications, a brief
glance at the cases usually relied on as announcing the fiduciary theory
and the director's duty to disclose, will discover the relatively parochial
circumstances of the corporations involved. Our endeavor has been to
select only those cases in which the director or officer was silent or
refrained from expressing warrantable enthusiasm as to the prospects of
the corporation.
Stewart v. Harris,4 for example, had to do with a Kansas bank with
500 shares outstanding. Stewart took charge of it when it was exceed-
ingly shaky and he had success in realizing on dubious collateral. It
appears that divers accretions in value and realizations on doubtful
assets had been carried in the cashier's accounts but not shown on the
bank's published statements; this persuasive feature, though not
involved in Stewart's trading, doubtless had some effect on the verdict
and opinion. So, also, the fact that Harris was a retired business man,
8o years old, who had never been a banker. He owned 12 shares.
Stewart was president and majority shareholder. They had several
talks, Stewart successively offering $I,OOO, $I,4OO, and $2,000 for the
shares. Stewart seems to have confined his representations to the sorry
state the bank had been in when he took charge of it, and to a "policy"
not to pay dividends but to strengthen the bank. Harris finally sold
for $2,oo. Later, Stewart having acquired 445 of the 500 shares, a
120 per cent dividend was declared. It appeared that the shares were
worth some $4,200 upon or soon after their purchase by Stewart. The
jury having found for Harris, judgment on their verdict was appealed.
The charge to the jury was express on the point that Stewart, as presi-
dent, was Harris's trustee and in duty bound to give Harris all available
information as to value. The Supreme Court approving the charge
said: "Plaintiff had the right to rely upon the belief that defendant
"Judge Dowling drew this distinction between the small quiet corporation and
the large public corporation excellently in McManus v. Durant (1915) i68 App.
Div. 643, 657, 154 N. Y. Supp. 580, 590.
" (1904) 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277.
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would disclose to him the true condition of the affairs of the bank and
that he would not be called upon to investigate its affairs before he could
with safety sell to defendant his holdings of stock."
The Nebraska case of Jacquith v. Mason 5 involved a small insurance
company. Plaintiff was a widow. She had talked to the president of
the company, who had told her nothing as to the company's condition or
the value of its shares. She placed her stock in the hands of a broker,
who sold her 20 shares, pursuant to her authorization, at $75 each, to
an agent, from whom it came into the hands of the president's copartner,
who resold it at $iio to a third person. There was some evidence that,
as partner at any rate, the president was interested in the resale.
Remote as he was from the actual purchase from her, she was allowed
to recover damages from the president. He was dealt with as if he had
procured her to sell her shares without having first disclosed to her the
condition of the company, the value of the shares and, if indeed it
existed, the expectation of a sale to the thilrd person at $iio.
This case and the following remind one of Bacon's remark that
"revenge is a kind of wild justice." (It will be recalled that Bacon went
on, "which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed
it out.")
Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.', related to a life insurance com-
pany of i,ooo shares controlled by two persons, the other 448 shares
being rather widely distributed. The plaintiff, who was chief book-
keeper, owned 3 shares. His shares and other minority shares were
bought by the vice-president at $200 each. The majority shares
realized, by a secret agreement with a purchasing insurance company,
about $i,ooo each, and the vice-president received a special stipend for
getting in the minority shares. The trial court had ruled and had
charged the jury that the officers were not bound to make any disclo-
sures as to the impending merger with another company. On appeal
from judgment for the defendants, the Supreme Court made a tremen-
dous review of the authorities and held eloquently for the fiduciary
duty to disclose. "Power akin to that of an attorney, priest, agent or
copartner is conferred on the directors and officers .... The fiduciary
obligation is to the stockholders in a body. Why not to the component
parts represented by the shares ?" The judgment was reversed.'17
The foregoing cases are the strongest that can be cited for the fidu-
ciary doctrine, the active duty to disclose even if not asked. Yet two
of them 8 have some abhorrent features assimilating them to those hard
M (191) 99 Neb. 509, 156 N. W. lO41.
(1916) 176 Iowa, 362, 157 N. W. 929.
' Oliver v. Oliver (19o3) 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S. E. 232, 233, contains the most
persuasive analysis of the doctrine and the decisions on it. But the opinion, which
is on overruling demurrer to bill, is almost wholly obiter, as features of fraud,
concealment, and agency would have amply sustained the bill.
'Stewart v. Harris, supra note 14; Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co. supra
note 16.
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cases that make bad law; while the third 9 must depend chiefly on the
extra-legal principle that a woman may change her mind; on adopting
as a legal maxim, "Heia age. Rumpe moras. Varium et inutabile
semper femina!: for, without representations or solicitations made to
her, she had authorized the sale by her broker at the very price her
shares brought. This unimpressive opinion is the only one even tending
to shake the conviction that, where there is neither representation by
the director nor disclosure that he is the purchaser, he ought not to be
held liable on the ground that he should have disclosed himself, the
corporate circumstances, and his reasons for buying.
The cases decided since the latest review20 are few and add little to
the development of the doctrine. In a Minnesota case2' the court held
that the weight of authority "is to the effect that a director or officer
does not stand in a fiduciary relation to a stockholder in respect of his
stock," and is as free to buy shares as any other stockholder is. The
court recognizes that "a minority of the courts" hold for the fiduciary
relation and the prerequisite of full disclosure before buying, but adds
that impending radical changes in the corporation, kept secret by the
director or officer, would usually have warranted recovery by the stock-
holder without resort to the fiduciary doctrine. The court, that is to
say, opts for the "special circu mistances" rule22 criticized by Mr.
Smith ;23 and their Honors add that it was for the jury to consider
whether the director failed to disclose information "which good faith
required him to disclose," and thus had been "guilty of fraudulent mis-
representations." The parties to this Minnesota suit had both been
connected with the corporate business, they dealt at arm's length, and
there was no special development pending, but merely the question of the
price of the shares, arrived at by leisurely dickering.
In Stout v. Cunningham24 a complaint was attacked by demurrer.
The defendant was a general manager. (The court deems this to be a
grade lower than that of director or officer. If this indicates that the
fiduciary rule must be restricted to directors, president, and vice-presi-
dents, it betrays additional irresolution on the part of judges to make
the rule sweeping as to all trusted corporate officials. Yet logic would
make the grades and ratings no less fiduciaries than the commissioned
officers.) The Idaho court rejected the fiduciary rule, and held that
"Jacquith v. Mason, supra note 15.
"H. R. Smith, op. cit. srtpra note 9.
"Seitz v. Frey (1922) 188 N. W. 266.
' Federal decisions seem to avoid declaring the fiduciary doctrine. Grant v
Attrill (1882, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) ii Fed. 469; Gillett v. Bowen (1885, C. C. D.
Colo.) 23 Fed. 625, 626. In Strong v. Repide (19o9) 213 U. S. 419, 431, 29
Sup. Ct. 521, 525, the duty of disclosure is held not to exist because of "rela-
tions . . . . of . . . . a fiduciary nature," but "because of the special facts"
(author's italics). Truer v. Clews (1885) 115 U. S. 528, 6 Sup. Ct. 155, was a
plain case of abuse of confidential information obtained in the course of acting as
trustee for a bankrupt.
' H. R. 'Smith, op. cit. supra note 9, at pp. 716, 717.
2 (1921) 33 Idaho, 464, 196 Pac. 208.
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failure to disclose information as to value or an impending resale at a
profit would not render a director or officer liable to a stockholder in
the absence of actual fraudulent misrepresentations. Judgment for
defendants on the demurrer was affirmed.
Upon the like demurrer, a complaint was held good in Utah that
alleged the officers to have frightened shareholders by reports of the
company's bad position, causing plaintiff to sell his shares to another
company, from which defendants later acquired them. The doctrine
of Carpenter v. Danforth25 was approved, but the complaint was deemed
adequately to allege fraud.26
The New Jersey case of Keely v. Black27 was' an instance of a
purchase of shares by a director at par, without disclosing an offer
made to him for a higher price for the shares. He resold and reaped a
profit. He was held to be under no liability to turn over his profits to
stockholders. The case, however, is not valuable as authority on our
question, for the plaintiff sued in behalf of the corporation, and was
not one of the stockholders who had sold to defendant.
If this fiduciary doctrine were fundamentally right or were applicable
to the greater part of dealings in shares, it would be a disservice to
decry it. But, first, the justice of imposing the fiduciary rule upon what
is commonly a matter of free trading, merely because there sometimes
are "special facts," is far from being self-evident. And, second, if
one would survey the dealings in corporate shares in English-speaking
countries and realize how vast is the proportion of shares dealt in upon
markets, and how generally market values, not concealed or latent values
alone, constitute the accepted prices, he could not escape, it is submitted,
conceding that a rule prohibiting directors from buying without first
making proclamation of their reasons would in most cases be an
absurdity. The usual situation, numerically speaking, is wholly differ-
ent from that where the director of a small unlisted corporation seeks
out his stockholders and makes offers for their shares. In the latter
case, let him be careful that he discloses his identity, speaks the truth,
answers questions honestly, and does not occupy a superior position
by reason of the stockholder's sex, youth, senility, and repos-
ing of trust in him; and let him have no fixed program in his mind
adverse to the good of the corporate enterprise. If he avoids
the pitfalls of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and implied representa-
tion, he should be allowed to keep the shares he buys and any profits
that he makes upon their resale. Should there be any "special facts,"
the courts will give them due weight, and can do so without importing
the fiduciary doctrine. The preponderance of courts and of the trend
of recent decisions seem to be against imposing upon directors this duty
of disclosure.
"Supra note 4.
White v. Texas Co. (i92I, Utah) 202 PaC. 826.
(192o) gi N. J. Eq. 52o, i1 AtI. 22.
